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THE PRESS AND THE OPPRESSED-A STUDY OF PREJUDICIAL
NEWS REPORTING IN CRIMINAL CASES*
Part II: Some Speculations and Proposals
CAROLYN JAFFE
Miss Jaffe is a member of the Illinois Bar. She is presently serving as Law Clerk to the Honorable
Julius J. Hoffman of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. She received the LL.B. degree in 1963 and the LL.M. degree in 1964 from the Northwestern University
School of Law, the latter under a Ford Foundation Fellowship in Criminal Law. Miss Jaffe has served
as Abstractor of Recent Cases for this Journalsince 1961 and acted as Managing Editor of the Northwestern University Law Review in 1962-1963.
When the news media publicize information commonly referred to as "prejudicial publicity," a
criminal defendant's right to a fair trial may be jeopardized. In Part I of this two-part article, published in the March, 1965 issue of the Journal,56 J. CRI. L., C. & P.S. 1 (1965), the author first
examined the applicable standards of impartiality which a jury must meet in order for a trial to be
constitutionally "fair," and then defined that "prejudicial publicity" which can render a jury unconstitutionally partial and hence a trial not constitutionally fair. Finally, existing methods which
have been used in an attempt to prevent defendants from being convicted by juries rendered partial
by publicity were critically examined, with emphasis on the effect of each of these methods upon the
co-existing interests of the press, the defendant, and the Government which are sought to be preserved.
In Part II, the author examines the possibility of expanding some of the existing solutions, with
emphasis on the importance of formulating and making known to the press, bar, and police a set of
standards delineating the kinds of material which are likely to deprive a defendant of a fair trial. After
examining the sources of prejudicial publicity and noting the probable futility of internal control by
the press, the author proposes a remedial statute. Results of a poll of lawyers, police officials and
newsmen conducted by the author are tabulated in appendices to Part IL-EIITOR.
IV: EXPANSION OF EXISTING METHODS

When the conclusion that existing means are inadequate was made, it was advanced not to state
that these means are inherently inadequate, but,
rather, with the qualification that they are inadequate as currently practiced by American courts.
Perhaps presently existing methods could be
utilized in such a way as to solve the problem without resort to more radical and severe means which
might represent the beginning of a trend that could
result in gradual but eventual erosion of freedom of
the press. However, this is not to say that the existing means will in fact be so utilized; rather it is
suggested as a possible solution short of, and, perhaps preferable to, more drastic means.
To speak of preventing conduct-here, the publication prior to termination of a criminal case of
* This article was submitted by the author in partial
fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Master
of Laws, Northwestern University School of Law, May
1964. Minor changes have been made to bring it up to
date.

material which might prejudice the jury against
the defendant-is to speak either of actually punishing someone or of putting him in fear of possible
consequences which may harm him at some future
time, unless he is willing to cease that conduct
without external compulsion or persuasion.
It has been suggested that the news media are
capable of voluntarily refraining from publishing
prejudicial material, particularly if the Bar were
to prescribe and itself adhere to reasonable standards to be followed. 120 Voluntary action has in fact
120 Daly, Ensuring Fair Trials and a Free Press: A
Task for the Press and the Bar Alike, 50 A.B.A.J. 1037
(1964); Current Events, 22 A.B.A.J. 79, 80 (1936)
(quoting from an editorial in the Jan. 18, 1936 issue of
the Toledo News-Bee). See LIEBLING, THE PREss 15960 (1960); Editorial, Publicity Scandals Demand Exer-

cise of Authority, 20 J. Am. Jun. Soc'Y 82, 83 (1936). A
proposed code of ethics for newsmen regarding publicity
of trials is presented at 22 A.B.A.J. 79 (1936). See
Brownell, Freedom and Responsibility of Ike Press in a
Free Country, 24 FoRDHAm L. REv. 178, 182, 186 (1955).
See Will, FreePress vs. FairTrial, 12 DE PAUL L. REv.

197, 213 n.58 (1963), for a description of some voluntary action.
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been taken in Rhode Island, where the two Providence dailies and many other newspapers do not
print any matter regarding a trial which takes
place outside the presence of the jury.Y However,
failure of the legal profession to enforce its own
Canon 2 0 122breeds disrespect on the part of the
The Oregon State Bar, the Oregon Newspaper Publishers Association, and the Oregon Association of
Broadcasters have adopted a Joint Statement of Princples to keep the public fully informed without violating the rights of any individual. While it fails specifically
to enumerate those kinds of material which may be
prejudicial, the Statement does spell out certain guidelines (e.g., good taste, presumption of innocence, fact
that readers and listeners are potential jurors, exploitation of news media by any lawyer considered unprofessional conduct) which both Bar and news media should
follow. The Statement concludes that the members of
the participating associations "testify to their continuing desire to achieve the best possible accomodation of
the rights of the individual and the rights of the public
when these two fundamental precepts appear to be in
conflict in the administration of justice." The author is
indebted to William F. Frye, District Attorney of Lane
County, Ore., for a copy of the Joint Statement.
A subcommittee of the Comittee on Jurisprudence of
the State Bar of Michigan is investigating the problem,
and early indications are that the Committee will
probably recommend the promulgation of rules by the
Michigan Supreme Court laying down guidelines and
covering all law enforcing agencies, attorneys, and members of the judiciary, to the effect that no pre-trial
statements be made. Letter from Larry S. Davidow,
Chairman of a Subcommittee of the Committee on
Jurisprudence of the State Bar of Michigan, April 21,
1964.
See also News Article, Suggests "Voluntary Restraint"
on PretrialNews Coverage, Chicago Daily Law Bulle-

tin, Feb. 24, 1964, p. 1, quoting from Edward L. Wright,
Chairman, ABA House of Delegates, and Donald K.
Gillnor, Associate Professor of Journalism, Univ. of
North Dakota.
Cf. the practice of the Psychiatric Institute of the
Municipal Court of Chicago, wherein reports of results
of mental examinations are given only to the referring
judge and the prosectuor only on trial date, and also
before trial to defense counsel on request. Letter from
E. J. Kelliher, M.D., Director, Psychiatric Institute of
the Municipal Court of Chicago, March 24, 1964.
54.03% of the persons responding to the writer's poll
agree ith the statement in the text. See Table I.
"2Address by Judge Joseph Weisberger Before the
National Conference of State Trial Judges, San Francisco, Aug. 4, 1962. See Will, supra note 120.
122Canon 20 of the ABA's Canons of Professional
Ethics condemns statements for publication by lawyers
re pending litigation. See Daly, supra note 120; Sowle,
A Free Press Vs. Fair Trial, Chicago Sun-Times, July

5, 1964, sec. 2, p. 2.
In a significant recent opinion, a unanimous Supreme
Court of New Jersey stated, by way of dictum:
"[Canon 20 prohibits] statements to news media by
prosecutors, assistant prosecutors and their lawyer
staff members, as to alleged confessions or inculpatory admissions by the accused, or to the effect that
the case is 'open and shut' against the defendant, and
the like, or with reference to the defendant's prior
criminal record, either of convictions or arrests. Such

press and tends to inhibit press self-control.m Such
strong forces as competition and the desire to sell
newspapers, moreover, would most likely prevent
effective internal control, 24 despite the fact that
this solution in ideology represents the best of all
possible worlds in this area of the law.
Since radio and television serve to inform the
public in brief of all important news events, newspaper editors and publishers are prone to believe,
and perhaps rightly so, that they must give the
public intricate details of morbid and shocking
crime news in order to continue to prosper. This is
not to say that radio and television are not also
guilty of exposing jurors to prejudicial publicity;125
statements have the capacity to interfere with a fair
trial and cannot be countenanced....
"The ban on statements by the prosecutor and his
aides applies as well to defense counsel. The right of
the state to a fair trial cannot be impeded or diluted
by out-of-court assertions by him to news media on
the subject of his client's innocence. The courtroom is
the place to settle the issue, and comments before or
during the trial which have the capacity to influence
potential or actual jurors... are impermissible.
".... Nothing is suggested herein which proscribes

the reporting of the evidence as it is introduced...
during the course of the trial."
State v. Van Duyne, 204 A.2d 841,852 (N.J. 1964).
The court thus is warning attorneys of disciplinary
action which is likely to be imposed in the future under
Canon 20.
m Letter from Brooks IV. Hamilton, Head of the
Dep't of Journalism, Univ. of Maine, March 23, 1964.
"If the Bar Association of America can state a code
of ethics covering the publicity of trials, which are
sensible and which do not violate decent practices of
free publication, and if they can discipline the members of their own profession to abide by that code,
they will be met more than half way.., by the great
majority of newspapers."
Current Events, supra note 120, at 80. See also Goldfarb, EnsuringFairTrials: The Impropriety of Publicity,

The New Republic, Feb. 29, 1964, p. 11.
12 11.29% of the persons responding to the writer's
poll mentioned competition and commercialism when
indicating that voluntary, internal control by the press
appears unlikely. See Table I. See, e.g., Colegrove,

Attitudes Toward Crime News-A Newspaperman's
Viewpoint, 4 NAT'L PROB. & PaRtit Ass'N J. 313

(1958); Editorial, supra note 120; cf. White, Newspaper
and Radio Coverage of Criminal Trials: A Modern

Dilemma, 41 J. C=. L., C. & P.S. 306 (1950). Contra,
Gallup, What Is Public Opinion?, 4 NAT'L PROB. &
PAsZoLE Ass'NzJ. 305 (1958).

Another view is that "trial by newspaper" is justified
because it serves the purpose of an important obligation
of the journalistic profession: to attempt to reduce
crime. Brown, A Newspaperman'sObligations,4 NAT'L

J. 307, 310 (1958); Mueller,
Problems Posed by Publicity to Crime and Criminal
Proceedings,110 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 15-17 (1961). Bud see
Deland, Crime News Encourages Deliquency and Crimne,
PRoB. & PAnoLE Ass'N

32 J. Ams. Jun. Soc'y 10 (1948).
125See, e.g., Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963);
Latham v. Crouse, 320 F.2d 120 (10th Cir. 1963);
Baltimore Radio Show v. State, 193 Md. 300, 67 A.2d
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but it does appear that the greatest culpability lies
with the newspapers.
Conferences between newsmen, members of the
legal profession, and law enforcement officials may
serve to enlighten some members of the journalistic
profession as to the possible deleterious conse12 6
quences of injudicious coverage of criminal cases.
For example, a conference on the subject in which
newsmen, police officials, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges participated, was held at
Northwestern University School of Law under
auspices of the Ford Foundation in May 19 62 .12
Although no proposed solution was unanimously
arrived at, and though newsmen almost uniformly
demanded empirical evidence that publication of
what defense attorneys call prejudicial publicity
in fact causes juries to be prejudiced against defendants 2 s one shining light did emanate from that
conference.
Shortly after it was held, Professor Fred E.
Inbau, co-chairman of the conference, received
from a Florida assistant managing editor who had
participated in the conference a copy of a recommendation which he had sent to the members of his
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staff and to managing editors of other Florida
newspapers, to the effect that alleged confessions
and prior criminal records should not be alluded to
in publications prior to termination of the trial. 29
But editors so enlightened are few and far between. It is doubtful whether such programs will
substantially affect enough journalists to come
close to solving the problem. Therefore, we must
speak either in terms of actually punishing someone, or of somehow scaring him into prodded, but
not whipped, compliance with the desired standard
of conduct.
Expansion of the available tools of reversing
convictions and granting the appropriate motions
available at the trial level might well serve to scare
the press into the desired moderation in covering
crime news. If it were impossible to obtain an impartial jury and hence a valid conviction because
of exposure to publicity, the press would not be
slow to realize that public indignation might eventually lead to the imposition of external sanctions,
and would therefore choose self-control in anticipatory self-defense, since external standards would
doubtless be more stringent and circulation-cutting
than what could voluntarily be adopted by the
press and approved by the judiciary. Mere liberali497 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 912 (1950); Hagans v.
State, 372 S.W.2d 946 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1962); cf. zation of currently prevailing tests of juror imUnited States v. Rees, 193 F. Supp. 861 (D. Md. 1961). partiality and standard of proof of prejudice would
126 The annual Short Course for Newsmen in Crime
News Analysis and Reporting at Northwestern Univ. tend toward this result.
The recent case of United States v. Accardo2 is
School of Law, very favorably mentioned in Mueller,
supra note 124, at 25 n.78, attempts to inform members illustrative. The defendant was convicted of makof the news profession of the possible consequencese.g., reversal of otherwise valid convictions-of exten- ing false statements on his income tax returns. Besive coverage of criminal cases. See also PrejudicialNtws fore and during his trial, his reputation for being inReporting in Criminal Cases, 1962 Ono ST. BAR ASS'N
volved in Chicago's underworld and the nationwide
R.EP. 773, 774, where lawyers are urged to explain the
crime syndicate was widely publicized by local
legal problems involved to newsmen.
In Maine a voluntary code of conduct has been de- newspapers and news broadcasts. Presuming prejuveloped between the news media, State Police, and dice from the circumstances, the Seventh Circuit
private general hospitals, and a similar code encompassing State hospitals is being prepared. No punishment is reversed on prejudicial publicity grounds. Inasprovided, other than that unofficial censure which is much as the reversal and its basis also received
expected to flow from failure to adhere to the standards
established. A jointly drafted code of advisory standards much publicity, 131the public might well have infor Massachusetts is being written by news and Bar ferred that, by publishing such articles as caused
groups. Letter from Brooks W. Hamilton, Head of the Accardo's conviction to be overturned, Chicago
Dep't of Journalism, Univ. of Maine, March 23, 1964.
news media were in fact, albeit unintentionally,
127 See FREE PREsS-FAIR TRIAL: A REPORT OF THE
PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE i PREJUrCAL NEws
aiding organized crime.
REPORTING IN CRIMINAL CASES (Inbau ed. 1964). This
In connection with the general problem, a leadpublication contains a verbatim transcription of the
ing Chicago editorial writer recently stated:
Conference, which was conducted by Northwestern
Univ. School of Law and the Medill School of Journal"As a result of prejudicial reporting and comism (Northwestern Univ.) under the direction of co12
See FREE PREss-FAiR TRIAL, op. cit. supra note
chairmen Fred E. Inbau, Professor of Law at Northwestern, and David R. Botter, Professor of journalism 127, at 202.
at Medill (deceased).
,
130United States v. Accardo, 298 F.2d 133 (7th
128 For the contrary view--tdat the press should prove
Cir. 1962).
that it does not cause prejudice-see Will, supra note
"I See, e.g., News Article, Chicago Daily News, Jan.
120, at 206-09. See also note 157 infra and accompany- 6, 1962, p. 12, col. 1, published the day after the revering text.
sal.
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ment, courts often grant changes of venue, con- ment" must actually punish, rather than merely
tinuances, and mistrials. Reporting and com- slap the offender on the wrist. In light of the ecoment have often been the ground on which nomic compulsion to publish detailed crime news,
most newspapers would merely write off a moderate
appellate courts have reversed convictions.
"Editors and publishers have little to fear fine as a business expense. For the contempt confrom the contempt procedure for prejudicial re- viction to constitute punishment which would reaporting or comment. But if they are not careful, sonably deter future misconduct by the news
they may be aiding a guilty man to escape pun- media, really stiff fines against the publishing
ishment so long as reviewing courts are so sensi- corporation and imprisonment of persons directly
tive to the presumed effect of what is printed."' ' 2 responsible for publication, as are imposed under
Moreover, in the great majority of cases, liberali- the successful English system, would seem neces135
zation of the standard of challengeability of jurors sary.
If either the persuasion by fright or punishment
for cause would result in the selection of a panel of
jurors impartial by federal constitutional criteria; by contempt technique is sought to be employed,
inability to obtain a jury would result only in the it is equally important that the news media be inmost highly publicized cases. Trial courts in two formed of the standards formulated--of what conrecent cases entered what appear to be valid judg- duct is disapproved. If the fright method derived
ments of conviction after having excused all po- from expansion of the test of juror impartiality and
tential jurors who might possibly have been standard of proof of prejudice is to be used, one
prejudiced against defendant by reason of pub- responsible for news coverage of criminal cases will
licity. 13
be hesitant to publish material he knows may occasion reversal or impossibility of trial, which in
In the absence of effective, freely-chosen voluntary action, then, extension of the existing remedies turn, he apprehends, may lead to the external conof reversal and trial level remedies may result in trols he abhors. If punishment is to be imposed for
the desired goal through the "scare" technique. constructive contempt, the publisher's awareness
But if those who publish prejudicial information of what specific information must not be published
prove either to be unaware of the possible threat to and when it must not be published will apprise him,
their seemingly invulnerable position or to be un- as required by due process, 3 ' of what he must rebelieving that such a threat could ever materialize, frain from doing on pain of contempt, and will perthen actual punishment will remain the only means mit him to act accordingly.
of preventing publication of prejudicial material.
The existing contempt power can be invoked Standards of Conduct
more frequently than at present to constitutionally
As discussed above, six kinds of material were
punish constructive contempt by the press, so long categorized as "prejudicial," within the general
as the information published constitutes a clear criterion that the material might not be admissible
and present danger to the sovereign's right to se- as evidence, and if jurors read or heard the macure the orderly administration of justice--i.e., in terial, they might reasonably use it in deciding the
context, to the right of the particular defendant to question whether a defendant is guilty. Since the
a fair trial.M As has been demonstrated, use of the information might never be admitted in evidence,
contempt power in this manner does no violence to the test of prejudice for purposes of punishment
freedom of the press. Presumably, punishment of
13See SuLuvAN, TiAL By NEwsPAPER 218-30
past misconduct will deter that contemnor and
(1961), for the view that those in high managerial
those similarly situated from publishing like in- positions, rather than reporters, should be held in conformation in the future. Of course, the "punish- tempt because of their policy-making power and financial interest in the newspaper. A further suggestion
is that those responsible for miscarriages of justice oc2 A. T. Burch, Press Coverage of Trials-Is Cause
of Jusike Hindered?, Chicago Daily News, May 30, casioned by trial by newspaper be made liable to the
prosecuting government for expenses incurred, e g cost
1964, p. 17, col. 8.
113United States v. Kline, 221 F. Supp. 776 (D. of a new trial after reversal and remand. Id. at 21i-18.
Minn. 1963) (court excused every potential juror who One of the persons participating in the writer's poll
had formed an opinion as to defendant's guilt or in- suggested that the newspaper be made liable in civil
to a vindicated defendant.
nocence); State v. St. Peter, 63 Wash. 2d 495, 387 P. damages
136 "Laws which create crime ought to be so explicit
2d 937 (1963) (court excused all potential jurors who
that all men subject to their penalties may know what
had read or heard of defendant).
acts it is their duty to avoid." United States v. Brewer,
'm See notes 46-64 supra and accompanying text, in
139 U.S. 278,288 (1891).
Part I of this article.
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must be whether, looking at the publication at the
time of publication, it is reasonably certain that the
defendant will be prejudiced if the jury is exposed
to the publicity. A publication meeting this test
constitutes at the tine of publication a clear and
present danger that the defendant will be prejudiced thereby-i.e., that the sovereign's right to
prosecute and conduct a fair criminal trial will be
endangered-and can therefore be punished without violating freedom of the press even if the danger never materializes--i.e., even if the information
is subsequently admitted as evidence. Of course,
subsequent admission would prevent the granting
of trial level remedies or reversal.
Since we are seeking to formulate explicit standards, perhaps at the outset we must eliminate the
sixth category of prejudicial material-miscellaneous material which may inflame the jury against
defendant. Although such material can have the
prejudicial effect sought to be eliminated, it is not
likely to have this effect in so many cases as will
material in the first five categories. Moreover,
whereas the first five kinds of material are susceptible of rather precise definition, this last type is not.
Thus, while recognizing that such miscellaneous
material can in some cases be prejudicial, it would
be wise not to include it for present purposes.
Applying the time element aspect of the test of
prejudice developed above, publication of material
in any of the first four categories (confessions,
criminal activities, tangible evidence, and statements of possible non-witnesses) prior to its actual
use as evidence at the trial (or, if never admitted,
prior to termination of the trial) would constitute
conduct so prejudicial as to warrant holding the
publisher in contempt. Publication of material in
the fifth category (proceedings out of jury's presence) would constitute such conduct if it occurred
before the jury was allowed to consider the object
of dispute in the proceeding (or, if never so allowed,
before termination of the trial). If the jury is extrajudicially exposed to material in any of the five
categories and the material is not later admitted as
evidence, the defendant should obtain relief by
trial level remedies or reversal.
The next logical question is how these standards,
for purposes of securing "voluntary" adherence
thereto by the fear-of-possible-future-consequences
method, or for purposes of putting a potential
contemnor on notice of what conduct is prohibited,
are to be conveyed to those affected by them.
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Presentationof the Standards
It has been suggested that the Bar advance
standards for the press to follow.in Such a standard
would be merely advisory as to those not members
of that Bar, however, and probably could not command respect from a substantial portion of the
press. A standard presented by the Bar would not
necessarily conform to the treatment, by courts in
its locality, of claims of prejudicial publicity or invocation of constructive contempt, unless those
courts first formulated the standards in a judicial
opinion. If the highest court of a state did formulate a standard, however, subsequent dissemination thereof to the press by the local Bar would aid
in achieving the desired result and would constitute a valuable public service. So long as the organized Bar fails to enforce its Canon 20 as against
its members, however, it would seem unrealistic to
expect more from the press vis-A-vis a Bar-promulgated standard of conduct for the press in the absence of exercise of active external sanctions.
If, as has been argued, publication of the enumerated kinds of material can constitutionally be
punished as contempt, any state court authorized
to promulgate rules of court could constitutionally
promulgate a rule specifying these categories and
announcing that publication prior to admission as
evidence, or termination of trial if not admitted,
of categorized material concerning criminal cases
pending before or being tried by jury in that court
will be dealt with as a contempt of court.
Should a court decide to expand the existing
methods of reversal and trial remedies rather than
to enlarge its current use of the contempt power,
it could, if so authorized by local law, render an advisory opinion that the enumerated kinds of material would, in the future, occasion reversal and
granting of trial level remedies which might make
trial in effect impossible. Or, perhaps, a State Attorney General could issue a similar statement as
to his interpretation of what the law now requires.
Evaluation of Expansion of Existing Metlwds
Unfortunately, it seems unlikely that either of
the possible expansions here suggested will be generally adopted, at least at the present time.
Although a few courts have begun to liberalize
the tests of juror impartiality and proof of prejudice, it is doubtful that this will cause such fear on
the part of a substantial segment of the press as to
make any significant inroads on the present scheme
17

See note 120 supraand accompanying text.
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of crime news reporting. Courts still adhering to
the stricter tests are loath to amend their stand for
fear that jury trials will thereby be rendered impossible in the context of our modem society with
its extensive news coverage of criminal cases. What
these courts do not realize is that, by temporarily
rendering effective criminal jury trials next to impossible in cases extensively covered, by an immoderate press,"' they may well insure that the
judicial system shortly thereafter will no longer be
plagued by the problem of prejudicial publicity.
And since most state judges are elected, and
federal judges, though appointed for life, are bound
by a Supreme Court decision ruling against their
possession of statutory power to punish constructive contempts, 1"' the possibility of punishing
enough constructive contempts to deter news media from publishing material here deemed prejudicial seems remote.
Before considering the use of more stringent
means against the press, however, it would perhaps
be advantageous to consider the possibility of preventing publication of the enumerated prejudicial
information by the indirect method of preventing
the information from ever reaching the news media
for publication.
V: PUNIsimiNG DIVULGENCE
Effective prohibition of divulgence to the press of
prejudicial material for purposes of publication by
the press 40 would render unnecessary the imposition of any positive external sanctions against the
news media, thus avoiding the argument that the
latter would run afoul of freedom of the press.,
However, punishing those who divulge prejudicial
material for publication may not be practicable in
light of the newsman's statutory privilege, recognized in a minority of the states, against being
compelled to reveal the source of his information.'4 '
133See note 133 supraand accompanying text.
139See note 40 supra,in Part I of this article.
M See Note, 50 J. Cnmt. L., C. & P.S. 374, 381-82
(1960).
M It may be that freedom of speech can more easily
be regulated than freedom of the press, since, although
the "clear and present danger" test applies to both,
perhaps a clearer, more present, greater danger is required to restrict freedom of the press than freedom of
speech, due to the particularly high reverence and regard in which freedom of the press is held.
I,- While neither the first amendment nor the common law operates to grant this privilege, Garland v.
Torres, 259 F.2d 545, 550-51 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 910 (1958); In re Goodfader, 45 Hawaii 317,
367 P.2d 472 (1961); In re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d
181 (1963), some 10 states grant the privilege by statute.

Certain policy considerations may also dictate
against the adoption of a non-divulgence statute.
Three general types of persons contribute to the
press most, if not all, of the crime news deemed
prejudicial in the preceding discussion. They represent (1) persons occupying the status of agents of
the government, (2) persons independent of both
the government and the news media, and (3) persons who are agents or employees of the news media.
(1) Government agents. The most obvious reason
for divulging to the press material with may
prejudice a jury against a prospective or present
criminal defendant is to secure his arrest and conviction. While this end serves the individual interests of prosecutors and law enforcement officers,
whose duty it is to protect the public from crime
and to alleviate public anxiety concerning unsolved
crimes, and who may release prejudicial material to
the press in order to gain favorable publicity for
themselves, 4 3 agents of executive and legislative
branches of government may also contribute such
material for similar considerations.'
Since all
these persons are officers of the state, their behavior as it affects the governmental process of
45
conducting trials can be regulated by the state.
Moreover, since members of the Bar and police
officers hold positions of privilege rather than of
right, the local Bar Association and Police DepartSee Comment, Compulsory Disclosure of a Newsman's
Source: A Compromise Proposal,54 Nw. U.L. REv. 243

(1959). See also Beecroft v. Point Pleasant Printing &
Publishing Co., 82 N.J. Super. 269, 197 A.2d 416 (L.
1964). Although the privilege presently exists in but a
small number of states, it would appear that any concerted effort to punish divulgence may provide impetus
for enactment of newsmen's-privilege statutes in other
states, the legislatures of which would, no doubt, be
influenced by press interests.
'41 See Wessel, Controlling Prejudicial Publicity in
Criminal Trials, 48 J. Am. JuD. Soc'y 105 (1964). For

examples of publicity emanating from the prosecution,
see Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571 (1958), affirming per
curiam 8 Ill. 2d 619, 137 N.E.2d 40 (1956); Stroble v.
California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952); United States v.
Leviton, 193 F.2d 848 (2d Cir. 1951); People v. Brommel, 56 Cal. 2d 629, 636, 15 Cal. Rptr. 909, 913, 364
P.2d 845, 849 (1961). See Sowle, A Free Press Vs. Fair
Trial, Chicago Sun-Times, July 5, 1964, sec. 2, p. 2.
Perhaps in a jurisdiction which is liberal in reversing
convictions on prejudicial publicity grounds, a defense
attorney might be inclined secretly to release information prejudicial to his client in hopes of subsequent reversal. See Note, 63 HARv. L. REv. 840, 852-53 (1950).
M Such persons may include local politicians, members of government agencies, and legislators. See, e.g.,
Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) (governor's
committee); Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107
(1st Cir. 1952) (congressional committee).
14- Cf. Baltimore Radio Show v. State, 193 Md. 300,
67 A.2d 497 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 912 (1950).
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ment, respectively, could prescribe standards of
non-divulgence with internal disciplinary action
for non-compliance. Enforcement and observance
of ABA Canon 20 alone would substantially aid the
problem."' The argument that preventing divulgence to the press will harm society by keeping
relevant information from the proper authorities
simply does not apply, since the source of information here consists of those authorities.
(2) Private Individuals. Private individuals, independent of both the government and the news
media, who may make statements for publication
which might be prejudicial include witnesses, victims, family or friends of the victim or of the accused, accomplices, and suspects. Although it could
constitutionally be effected, punishing such private
individuals for making disclosures to the press in
order to prevent similar disclosures in the future
may be inadvisable. Here, the argument that prevention of disclosure would be against the public
interest inasmuch as pertinent information may be
made unavailable to the authorities does apply,
since persons possessing otherwise inaccessible information relevant to the solution of a crime, may,
for various reasons, fear going to the authorities.
In such cases, a criminal might go free but for
the individual's willingness to tell his story to a
newsman. Furthermore, since such private persons
are not likely to repeatedly be in possession of
information re crime and probably would lack actual knowledge of a sanction invocable against
them, punishing them would serve no substantial
deterrent purpose.
(3) Employees of News Media. While employees
of news media can be treated as private individuals insofar as their function of supplying the media
with information for publication is concerned, the
arguments against the punishment of divulgence
by private individuals do not apply to reporters
and "informers." Unlike members of the Bar and
police officials, newspaper employees are not subject to effective disciplinary action of any organized
group. Although the American Society of Newspaper Editors has adopted a set of ethical canons,
no disciplinary machinery exists for its enforce116See Wright, A Judge's View: The News Media and
CriminalJustice, 50 A.B.A.J. 1125, 1126 (1964). Canon
20 of the American Bar Association's Canons of Professional Ethics, of course, applies to prosecuting and
defense attorneys alike. See State v. Van Duyne, 204
A.2d 841 (N.J. 1964), more fully discussed in note 122
supra, for an analysis of the Canon's scope, and for one
court's method of putting attorneys on notice that the
Canon will be enforced.
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ment.147 Thus, the only possible sanction against

these persons is by state action. If a statute were
to punish acts of divulging prejudicial material
only when committed by employees of news media,
however, it would likely be held invalid as violative
of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 14 The policy reasons favoring disclosure by private persons not affiliated with the press
dictate against the universally applicable nondivulgence statute which would comply with the equal
protection clause. Consequently, although press
employees constitute an important source of prejudicial information, only those persons subject to
government regulation by virtue of their status as
officers of the state should be made subject to
sanctions for divulgence of prejudicial material to
the press.
In a state with a newsman's-privilege statute, a
statute or internal regulation against divulgence
would be totally ineffective unless the privilege
statute were either repealed or amended to permit
compulsion of disclosure of a newsman's source in
cases where application of the nondivulgence
statute or regulation is the reason for attempting
to discover the source.14 9
Although non-criminal punishment could probably be imposed by local Bar Associations and
Police Departments in such a way as effectively
to prevent divulgence of prejudicial information
to the press, imposition of criminal penalties by the
state would probably be a better method. Uniformity of incidence and substance throughout
the state, essential for the purpose of securing
that uniform compliance which is necessary to insure that every criminal defendant within the
jurisdiction can exercise his right to a fair trial, is
attainable only by a state-wide statute. Moreover,
since a state legislature could emasculate nondivulgence regulations by enacting an unqualified
newsman's-privilege statute, provisions to punish
divulgence should ideally be promulgated by the
legislature.
Even if the proposed non-divulgence statute
would effectively prevent the press from obtaining
147See Will, supra note 120, at 212.
'"8 As an unreasonable classification. It is arguable,
though, that the classification is reasonable because it is
based upon the policy favoring disclosure by private

individuals not affiliated with the press.

149Such amendment would render the statute similar
to the Arkansas statute, AxK. ANN. STAT. §43-917

(Supp. 1961), which, unlike other newsmen's-privilege
statutes granting an absolute privilege, excepts from its
operation communications made in bad faith and not in
the interest of public welfare.
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prejudicial material from those to whom the statute would apply, still some would reach the press
from those to whom it would not. The question
remains whether, if the non-divulgence statute is
not adopted, or is adopted but is ineffective since
much prejudicial material still reaches the press
from sources which are immune because of a newsman's-privilege statute or because a prosecutor
consistently exercises his discretion not to prosecute under the non-divulgence statute, sanctions
more drastic than those already discussed and
dismissed as ineffective or improbable of exercise
should be invoked.
VI: PUNISHNG PUBLICATION

tion of prejudicial material would be passed by the
state for the purpose of maintaining its sovereign
right to preserve a fairly administered judicial
system. If the one can supersede freedom of the
press, why cannot the other?
A statute punishing the publication of prejudicial material would be analogous to a statutory
or inherent contempt power under which acts interfering with the orderly administration of justice
are punishable, to the extent that the former
would enumerate and specify acts which fall within
the more general terms of the latter. The same
constitutional criteria should therefore apply to
both processes. Since publication of such material
constitutes a clear and present danger to the government's right to fairly administer criminal justice, a statute punishing publication should not
offend the first amendment.ln Moreover, enactment of such a statute ciearly delineating the five
kinds of prejudicial material outlined aboveM and
providing for indictment and trial as for any other
statutory offense would be perhaps even more
palatable than use of the contempt power, inasmuch as the standards required would be unmistakable and available to all persons covered, and
since a valid objection to the contempt powerthat the judge whose courtroom was affected by
the contemptuous act summarily tries the contempt action-is absent' 55

Since the earlier discussed "solutions" apparently fail effectively to protect the criminal defendant's right to a fair trial, and thus necessarily
fail to protect sovereign rights as well, I believe
that the answer to this remaining question must
be an emphatic "Yres."
The justification for making the right to a fair
trial apparently supersede freedom of the press is
that here, as in the obscenity and sedition cases,
what is essentially being safeguarded is the public."' Just as the public is benefited by reasonable
restrictions on offensive and dangerous material,
so would it be benefited by reasonable restrictions
on prejudicial material-for the government is the
losing party when a miscarriage of justice occurs
VII: PROPOSAL
as a result of the publication of prejudicial material, and what is the government if not the public?
A comprehensive statute encompassing both
An analogy can be drawn from the recent case divulgence and publication would be the best posof United States v. Fidler,"5' where the district
sible solution, short, of course, of voluntary recourt rejected defendant's argument that freedom
straint by the press. Since the non-divulgence and
of the press prohibited the federal government
prevention of publication sought is with regard to
from prosecuting him for violating section 605 of exactly the same material, a single statute should
the Federal Communications Act. 52 Defendant, be utilized.1l '
a newsman, had intercepted police radio messages
Since the legislature will be considering a bill
and divulged newsworthy portions to a radio sta- which its members, as elected officials, will invarition. The court refused to grant defendant's motion ably find repugnant, it seems provident to be willto dismiss the information, holding, inter alia, ing to settle for legislation covering less than all of
that since freedom of the press is not absolute, the kinds of material deemed prejudicial in the
the first amendment did not prohibit application
earlier discussion. Although each of the five cateof section 605 to defendant. In Fidler, the con- gories of information can properly be called prejugressional right, embodied in a criminal statute, to dicial in the sense that a dear and present danger
keep the lanes of interstate commerce free and is presented, and although a bill covering all five
untrammeled was held to supersede freedom of
15 See notes 46-64 supra and accompanying text, in
the press. Proposed legislation to punish publicaPart I of this article.
to See notes 62-64 supra and accompanying text, in
14 See notes 25-37 supra and accompanying text, in
Part I of this article.
Part I of this article.
'5 202 F. Supp. 356 (N.D. Cal. 1962).
155
See, e.g., Will, supra note 120, at 214.
5
15248 Stat. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. §605 (1958).
16
See id. at 215.
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categories can constitutionally be drafted and
should initially be advocated, one has yet accomplished much if coverage of the most harmful of
the items is attained. Punishing divulgence or publication of information relating to confessions and
to previous criminal activity would seem to prevent
the publication of that material which is most
likely to be highly prejudicial in the most circumstances. Moreover, if material regarding confessions and previous criminal activities cannot be
published, much of the material in the remaining
categories will be less prejudicial or perhaps even
devoid of the capacity to interest the public.
In order to increase the likelihood of enactment
into law of this or a similar proposal, a scientific
study should be conducted in order to establish a
causal connection between exposure to prejudicial
publicity and partiality.157 In light of press influence on legislation, at least some endorsement of,
or, at the very least, acquiescence in the proposal
by the press probably would, as a practical matter,
be necessary in order to have it enacted; tangible
evidence of a causal connection would likely lead
to endorsement by the more enlightened members
of the press. The foregoing should not be construed
to imply that there is a doubt as to causal connection-only that this proof would increase the
chances of enactment of the proposed statute.11 8
In drafting a proposed statute, the time during
which divulgence or publication of the material
shall be punishable must be delineated. It has been
demonstrated that publication of prejudicial material is in fact prejudicial, as that term has herein
been defined, if it occurs prior to admission of the
contents of the material as evidence in court. The
acts of divulgence or publication should be punishable if committed at any time after a criminal act
has been committed and before the material is
"'

Cf. Roper, Public Opinion Surveys in Legal Pro-

ceedings, 51 A.B.A.J. 44 (1965); Sherman, The Use of
Public Opinion Polls in Continuance and Venue Hearings, 50 A.B.A.J. 357 (1964). Contrary to the notion

that such a study would or could not prove fruitful is
the Second Circuit's use of public opinion polls as evidence to show that the defendant in United States ex
rel. Bloeth v. Denno, 313 F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 1963), did
not receive a fair trial. See FREE PREss-FAnR

TRIAL,

op.

cit. supra note 127, at 183-201. 66.13% of the persons
responding to the writer's poll agree that reliable statistics would make enactment of a statute or regulatory
measure more likely, but 12.10/ of those responding do
not believe that reliable statistics could be obtained.
See Tables I & VIII.
I's See FRaE PREss-FAIR

TRIAL,

op. cil. supra note

127, at 183-201, especially remarks of Mr. Harris
Steinberg.

admitted in evidence, or if not admitted, until
termination of the trial.
What was said earlier concerning expansion of
the constructive contempt power with regard to
the punishment to be imposed'12 is equally applicable here. While a usual misdemeanor penalty
would probably deter the individual from divulging prejudicial material, only a substantial fine
and possible prison sentence will deter actual publication.
VIII: MODEL STATUTE

For implementation of the desired prohibitions,
it is necessary to embody the above proposals into
a definite structure. The statute which follows is
designed as a guide to any state' 60 which desires
to impose reasonable restrictions upon the divulgence and publication of specified prejudicial
material in order to assure that the constitutional
right to trial by an impartial jury will more often
be fact than fiction. The entire statute is intended
to represent the broadest possible measure which
could constitutionally be promulgated. However,
adoption only of the unbracketed portions will
strongly be advocated, since the more specific and
less restrictive the statute, the greater its deterrent
force, probability of enactment, and likelihood of
being found constitutional.'
An Act to Prevent the Disseminationof Prejudicial
Publicity62

§1. Subject to the exceptions set forth in §§2
1(c), 2 2(b), 2 3(b), 2 4(c), 2 5(b), and §3,
159See note 135 supra and preceding and accompanying text.

160The substantive provisions of the statute could be
incorporated into the Code of a Bar Association or of

an association of newsmen, and could also be used as a
guide for possible police department regulations regarding divulgence.
161Part

or all of the bracketed portions could be used

by local associations of lawyers, or of newsmen, or by
police departments if these groups desire to adopt
measures more stringent than those in the narrowest
statute. For these purposes, or for a state in favor of a
statute somewhat broader than that contained in the
unbracketed portions, the author would recommend
§2, 4(b)(1) in whole or in part, and §2, 5. The part
of §2, 44(b)(1) which could most advantageously be
included is that regarding the results of scientific tests.
162Note to Model Statle
§1. "Criminal act" as used herein means an act which
constitutes a crime under the laws of the state; "trial"
is a state trial. The nature of the offense and its punish-

ment are to be determined by the state. See Tables VI &
VII for the results as to this last matter.
§2. Note that if material deemed prejudicial is di-

vulged or published during the specified time period, the
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any person responsible for the publication policy
or broadcasting policy of any newspaper, magazine, radio station, television station, or any other
news-disseminating agency which publishes or
broadcasts, or any person formally connected with
act of so divulging or publishing is punishable as a vio-

lation of the statute regardless of subsequent events.

1,3, 4(a) &4(b) (i) are drafted in terms of statements
which may be prejudicial to any particular person, inasmuch as the kinds of statements therein described are
likely to be publicized at any time after a crime has been
committed, including the period before any person has
been officially accused of having committed it. On the
other hand, since statements described in
2 and
4(b) (2) are very unlikely, because of the nature of their
contents, to be publicized until after someone has been
officially accused of having committed a crime, these
paragraphs have been drafted in terms of statements
which may be prejudicial to any person officially accused of having committed a crime, rather than in
terms of any particular person. The reason for making
this distinction in the statute is to avoid the possibility
of an attack on its constitutionality on the ground that
it is an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of the states'
police power, in that it makes punishable an act not
reasonably certain to be harmful to the state. See, e.g.,
People v. Munoz, 9 N.Y.2d 51, 211 N.Y.S.2d 146, 172
N.E.2d 535 (1961). For example, if §2, 2 applied to a
statement concerning the criminal activities of any
particular person, a news article inadvertantly published after a crime has been committed, perhaps as a
part of a study of the rehabilitation of ex-convicts,
which concerns the criminal record of someone, would
violate the statute. Similarly, if §2, 94(b)(ii) applied to
a statement reasonably tending to impair the defense
of any particular person to any crime, an article in which
one person called another a liar would violate the statute.
The time at which statements described in §2, 5
become subject to the statute is dearly delineated by
their very nature.
"Officially accused," as used herein, means arrested
and/or indicted. This definition would therefore include
one presently a defendent in a criminal case.
§2, 94(b)(1). Statements made by a homicide victim
which reasonably tend to incriminate any particular
person are inadmissible as evidence in court except under certain circumstances [most commonly as "dying
declarations"; see, e.g., Cannon v. State, 225 Md. 543,
171 A.2d 699, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 906 (1961)], and the
prejudice which publication of such statements would
cause a defendant if they are not later admitted at the
trial is as immeasurable as it is obvious. "Scientific
tests" under the statute include those in the fields of
ballistics, fingerprints, handwriting identification, polygraphs, blood types, etc.
§2, 94(b) (2). The phrase "criminal act" is intentionally used here instead of "crime," with regard to the
defense of an accused. This choice was made in order to
prevent the possibility that one officially accused of a
particular offense for the commission of a criminal act
which may constitute more than one statutory offense
will be prejudiced with regard to his defense(s) to the
offense(s) of which he has not been accused. For example, one who has been accused of manslaughter, but
later is tried for murder, may be prejudiced by the
publication of statements negating the defense of no
premeditation.

the administration of law, including its practice or
enforcement, who divulges to any newspaper,
magazine, radio station, television station, or any
other news-disseminating agency, at any time between the commission of an alleged criminal act
and the termination of the trial of any person for
that act, any statement deemed in §2 of this Act
to be prejudicial, shall be guilty of a
punishable by
§2. Any statement, whether of fact or opinion
or otherwise, which communicates information of
one or more of the following types, is deemed to
be prejudicial:
1. Confessions
a. That any person has confessed to any
crime, or
b. The contents of any confession, or any
part thereof.
c. Exception: It shall not be a violation of
this statute to divulge or publish the
fact or contents of a confession after it
has been admitted as evidence at the
trial.
2. Criminal Activities
a. That any person officially accused of
having committed any crime has ever
committed a crime on another occasion,
or has been convicted of, acquitted of,
arrested for, accused of, or indicted for
the commission of any other crime.
b. Exception: It shall not be a violation of
this statute to divulge or publish any
statement covered by §2 2(a) after it
has been admitted as evidence at the
trial.
3. Tangible Evidence
a. That any tangible evidence has been obtained, whereby such evidence reasonably tends to connect any particular
person with the commission of any crime.
b. Exceptions: It shall not be a violation of
this statute to divulge or publish (1) any
statement covered by §2 3(a) after the
evidence has been admitted at the trial,
or (2) that tangible evidence has been
obtained, provided that the statement
does not reasonably tend to connect any
particular person with the commission
of any crime.
4. Statements of Unswom Witnesses
a. That any person is of the opinion that
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any particular person has committed any
crime, or
b. That any person has made a statement,
whether as fact or opinion or otherwise,
or the contents of any statement, or any
part thereof, which (1) reasonably tends
to connect any particular person with
the commission of any crime (such statements include, but are not limited to:
identifications by any person of a particular person as the perpetrator of any
crime; statements attributing to a particular person a motive for the commission of any crime; statements made by
a homicide victim; and results or inferences drawn from results of scientific
tests); or (2) reasonably tends to discredit or otherwise impair the defense of
one officially accused of having committed any criminal act (such statements
include, but are not limited to: statements which reasonably tend to impeach
the credibility of one who has been officially accused of any criminal act or of
any person who has been or is reasonably
expected to be called to testify at the
present or pending trial of the accused;
or to attribute to one who has been
officially accused of any criminal act a
motive for the commission of any criminal act; or to establish the sanity of one
who has been officially accused of any
criminal act).
c. Exception: It shall not be a violation of
this statute to divulge or publish any
statement covered by §2 4(a) or (b)
after it has been admitted as evidence
at the trial.
5. Closed Court Proceedings.
a. Transcripts, reports, or summaries of
occurrences taking place during the
course of proceedings from which the
jury has been excluded by the trial
court.
b. Exception: It shall not be a violation of
this statute to divulge or publish any
statement covered by §2 5(a) concerning a proceeding held to determine admissibility of evidence or of a confession
after the evidence or confession has been
admitted at the trial.
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§3. General Exceptions-This statute shall not
apply to:
1. The divulgence or publication, after a trial
has commenced, of statements deemed by
§2 to be prejudicial, if
a. A defendant has waived his right to trial
by jury, or
b. A trial court has ordered that the jury
be confined during the course of the trial.
2. The divulgence or publication, at any time
after a crime has been committed, of the
fact that a particular person has been officially accused of having committed the
crime.
IX: SoMEx PROBLEMS AND SPECULATIONS

Many problems, beyond the scope of this paper,
would exist even if the proposed solution were
adopted. For example, the statutory scheme above
was intended to be promulgated at the state level.
What of a defendant who commits an act-such as
robbing a federal bank-which constitutes both a
state and a federal offense? His federal trial may
be conducted after termination of the state statutory period of prohibition on divulgence and
publication. And as to an act which violates only
federal law, no state statute would apply to punish
divulgence or publication. Perhaps the federal
government could pass a similar statute applicable to all news media subject to the commerce
power. Almost every newspaper and radio or television station would be covered. But to what
criminal acts would the divulgence and publication relate? Acts in violation of federal law, or of
the laws of one state, or of more than one? Presumably, if an act violated any penal law, publication in the lanes of interstate commerce of material
herein defined as prejudicial with regard to that
act could constitutionally be covered by a federal
statute.
Another untreated question relates to proceedings subsequent to termination of an initial criminal trial. What of the defendant who appeals his
conviction? Maybe even appellate judges can be
unconsciously influenced by material regarding the
defendant published after judgment of conviction
and before disposition of the appeal. And what
will happen to the defendant who succeeds in obtaining reversal and new trial? What if the jury
impanelled at his retrial read, after his first conviction and before retrial was ordered, that he confessed, and the confession was coerced and cannot
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be introduced? Carrying this line of reasoning to
its inevitable conclusion, publication of prejudicial
material at any time when a new trial may still be
granted--i.e., until a defendant has exhausted his
state remedies, failed to get certiorari from the
United States Supreme Court, and failed in his
petition for federal habeas corpus and in his appeals to the federal Court of Appeals and the
United States Supreme Court from its denial--can
prejudice a defendant's right to a fair trial.
What if the prosecutor refuses to enforce the
statute? Mandamus lies only to compel performance of a clear legal duty; the prosecutor has discretion. Prohibition lies to correct a flagrant abuse
of discretion-but try and prove it against our
kind-hearted prosecutor.
What if the newsman says, "My experienced
attorney advised me that the material I divulged
(or published) was not within the statute"? Presumably, the individual states' legal rules regarding mistake of law and mistake of fact as a defense
in criminal cases would govern. But these defenses
are singularly misunderstood and misapplied due
to their inherent conceptual difficulty.
What of the "exceptional case"? In the case of
Lee Harvey Oswald, for instance, one who published facts regarding his Communist sympathies
and personal background could persuasively argue
that this action was necessary, or at least justifiable, to avert national panic.16 Oswald did not
confess, but had he done so, publishing that fact
would probably have been in the national interest.
Even in the case of the "Boston Strangler," whose
activities have considerably upset a large number
of citizens, perhaps publication of a confession, if
obtained, could be justified, though not so much
as in the Oswald case.1 1
If the Oswald-type case should be treated differently from the garden variety case, in what manner
should this be accomplished? One might argue
that a person who kills a President of the United
States waives all rights against having facts about
himself published, much as in the right to privacy
cases in tort law one may be held to waive that
right if he is a public figure. But this argument
presumes that, before trial according to established
procedures required by the federal constitution,
13 But see Editorial, Canon 35 Is Not Enough, 48 J.
Am. Jun. Soc'y 83, 84 (1964), quoting from the Report
of the Warren Commission.
1" See generally Wessel, supra note 143, for a discussion of weighing the interests for and against disclosure
and publication.

we have decided that he did commit the act. In
an exceptional case the prosecutor's discretion not
to prosecute the publisher might be relied upon.
Or, perhaps, a declaratory judgment might be obtained permitting publication. A procedure might
be devised for obtaining a court order permitting
publication which, in absence of the order, would
violate the statute. Probably such procedure
would have to be incorporated in the statute itself.
Any procedure for obtaining immunity from operation of the statute, though, should be strictly dealt
with, lest the statute become in effect inoperative.
Another possible problem is that if most official
or seemingly sanctioned comment regarding criminal cases ceases, it may be replaced by rumors not
carried by the news media which may be even
more detrimental to the defendant.
Certain beneficial indirect effects may result if
lurid crime news is no longer published. The newspapers may well find they must improve the quality of their product if they are to keep selling
papers. Perhaps more important, citizens will tend
to view the administration of criminal justice as
what it was meant to be within our system of
government, rather than as what current journalistic practices may lead them to believe.
CONCLUsION

It is at best a difficult task to propose sanctions
designed to achieve a desired result where, by the
very nature of the situation, the most effective
sanctionors are at the mercy of the sanctionees.
Even if a statute such as that proposed cannot be
adopted and extensive use of the constructive contempt doctrine cannot be realized for this Machiavellian reason, liberalization of the tests of juror
impartiality and standard of proof of prejudice,
which would result in fair trials in many cases and
in increased difficulty in obtaining valid convictions in those cases receiving flagrant and extensive publicity, may well serve as an indirect sanction that eventually will yield the desired result.
Perhaps in the final analysis, the greatest service
an interested lawyer can perform in this area is to
observe the ABA Canons of Ethics, to prod his
Bar Association toward concern, and to talk loudly
and write profusely about promulgating anti-publication statutes, suspecting all along that his goal
is not really enactment of a statute, but rather
the playing of a personal role in the campaign to
coerce the press into enlightened self-restraint.
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EXPLANATORY NOTE

The following material includes a letter (Appendix I) distributed to participants in the Annual
Short Course for Defense Attorneys in Criminal
Cases and for Prosecuting Attorneys given at
Northwestern University School of Law in the
Summer of 1963; a letter (Appendix II) mailed in
March, 1964 to participants and lecturers in the
following Short Courses and Conferences, all held
at Northwestern University School of Law: the
1962 and 1963 Short Courses for Defense Attorneys in Criminal Cases and for Prosecuting Attorneys, the 1963 Short Course for Newsmen in Crime
News Analysis and Reporting, the 1962 Conference
of Police Officials, Prosecuting Attorneys, Defense
Counsel, Judges, and Legislators, and the 1962
Conference on Prejudicial News Reporting in
Criminal Cases; the Questionnaire (Appendix III)
distributed to them; and (Tables I-IX) results of
the poll, reflecting the responses of the 124 persons
who answered the Questionnaire.
APPENDIX I

Letter to Participants in Annual Short Course for
Defense Attorneys in Criminal Cases
and Short Coursefor Prosecuting
Attorneys, Northwestern Law
School, Summer 1963
Dear Sir:
Since I intend to practice in the field of criminal
law, I am particularly interested in and concerned
about the problem of prejudicial publicity. I have
researched the case law and law review articles on
this subject in the preparation of a law review
article [Comment, The Case Against Trial by Newspaper: Analysis and Proposal. 57 Nw. U.L. REv.
217 (1962)], and have formulated therein a proposed solution to the problem. I concluded that a
statute, punishing both divulgence to the press
and publication by the press of certain specified
kinds of information, could be constitutionally
promulgated. Such a statute would enable both
the sovereign prosecuting the case and the criminal
defendant to try that case in a court of law before
an impartial jury, rather than before a jury which,
because of exposure to the extrajudicial "trial"
conducted in the newspapers, cannot possibly be
fair and impartial. The harm suffered by the state
because of reversals occasioned by prejudicial publicity is no less acute than that suffered by the
defendant who is unfairly convicted.
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I was graduated from Northwestern University
School of Law in June, 1963, and during the coming academic year will be working toward the degree of Master of Laws under a Ford Foundation
grant. In expanding my article into a thesis, and
with a view toward urging the actual adoption of
measures to protect against "trial by newspaper",
I would like to go beyond my academic research
and ascertain what criminal lawyers, both prosecutors and defense attorneys, think of the proposed
plan. For this reason I ask you to read the proposed statute, reproduced on the attached sheets,
and answer the questions which follow it. The
completed questionnaire will be collected from you
at the end of the short course. Results of this survey will be incorporated in the thesis, but identity
of the participants will be kept confidential.
Thank you for your co-operation.
Sincerely,
APPENDIX

I

Cover Letter Mailed to Persons Polled,
Winter 1964
Dear Sir:
Since I intend to practice in the field of criminal
law, I am particularly interested in and concerned
about the problem of prejudicial publicity. I have
researched the case law and law review articles on
the subject in the preparation of a law review article [Comment, The Case Against Trial by Newspaper: Analysis and Proposal, 57 Nw. U.L. REv.
217 (1962)], and have formulated therein a proposed solution to the problem. I concluded that a
statute, punishing both divulgence to the press
and publication by the press of certain specified
kinds of information, could be constitutionally
promulgated. Such a statute would enable both
the sovereign prosecuting the case and the criminal
defendant to try that case in a court of law before
an impartial jury, rather than before a jury which,
because of exposure to the extra-judicial "trial"
conducted in the newspapers and other news
media, cannot possibly be fair and impartial. The
harm suffered by the government because of reversals occasioned by prejudicial news reporting is
no less acute than that suffered by the defendant
who is unfairly convicted.
I graduated from Northwestern University
School of Law in June, 1963, and am a member of
the Illinois Bar. During the current academic year
I am working toward the degree of Master of
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Laws under a Ford Foundation grant. In expanding my article into a master's thesis, and with a
view toward urging the possible adoption of
measures to protect against "trial by newspaper,"
I would like to go beyond my academic research
and ascertain what people actually in contact with
the problem-prosecuting and defense attorneys,
police officials, judges, and journalists-think of
the proposed plan. For this reason I ask you to
read the proposed statute, reproduced on the attached sheets, and answer the questions which
follow it.
Your cooperation in returning the completed
questionnaire to me in the enclosed self-addressed,
stamped envelope will be deeply appreciated. Results of this survey will be incorporated in the
thesis, but identity of the participants will be kept
confidential.
Thanking you for your assistance and cooperation, I am
Very truly yours,
APPENDIX HI
Questionnaire
1. Does existing law in this area (i.e., motions
for change of venue, continuance, etc.; reversing convictions shown to have been based upon
the influence of publicity; cautionary instructions) adequately protect a defendant's right
to a fair trial?
2. If not, would a change in the test of impartiality be a satisfactory remedy? Would it be
possible to apply, as a practical matter, a test
less rigid than the prevailing one (that a prospective juror who has read about the case and
has formed an opinion as to the defendant's
guilt cannot be discharged for cause if he
testifies that he nonetheless can render a fair
and impartial verdict based solely on the evidence presented in court)?
3. Could the courts' contempt power, statutory
and/or inherent, be utilized to punish newspapers which publish material prejudicial to a
criminal defendant, or would such citations

always violate the First Amendment? Would
exercise of this power help to solve the problem?
4. Does the proposed statute, considered as a
whole, violate freedom of speech and/or freedom of the press? Would your answer be
different if 13, 4, & 5 of §2 were omitted?
5. If you think the statute as here presented is
unconstitutional, what changes would you
make to render it constitutional?
6. (A) Can the state impose restrictions (i.e.,
deterrence through punishment, not prevention
through prior restraint) upon public or quasipublic officials which it could not impose upon
the general public? (B) If so, are private defense attorneys so classified along with prosecutors and police officials?
7. In light of both policy considerations and the
question of constitutionality, should the regulatory measure be in the form of a statute as
here presented, or in the form of a regulatory
measure adopted by a specific group (e.g.,
Bar Association, Police Department) to apply
only to those subject to its sanctions? If a
statute, what should be the nature of the offense, and what punishment should be provided? If an internal regulation, what punishment?
8. Would such a statute (or regulation) be more
likely to be enacted if the enacting body were
confronted with reliable statistics indicating
that there is, in fact, a correlation between
exposure to prejudicial publicity and partiality
or bias or jurors?
9. (A) Is there any possibility that the problem
can be solved through internal control exercised by the newspapers? (B) Would such a
solution be encouraged by the preparation of
advisory standards to be followed by the press,
prepared by a State Bar Association, State
Supreme Court, or the like?
10. In your opinion, what kinds of material are the
most likely to be harmful to a criminal defendant, if published prior to or during trial?
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TABLE I

TABLE III

COMPILATION OF RESPONSES TO QUESTIONNAIRE
PERCENTAGE FIGURES

REASONS FOR RESPONSE OF "No" To QUESTION 3
PERCENTAGE FIGURES

(N = 124)

(N = 59)

Question

Yes

No

Maybe

No
Answer

Unconstitutional

Elected
Judges

Burden on
Judiciary

Miscellaneous

No Reason
Given

1
2
3
4
st
6

32.26
25.81*
28.23
47.58

55.65
44.35
47.58
37.90

8.06
7.26
13.71
8.87

4.03
22.58
10.48
5.65

40.68

23.73

8.48

11.86

15.25

A&B
57.26

A
11.29

66.13
29.84
34.68

15.32
15.32
41.13
35.48

4.03 112.10
7.26
24.19
16.94

11.29
4.84
12.90

TABLE IV
RESPONSE TO QUESTION 5
CHANGES IN STATUTE SUGGESTED BY PERSONS
RESPONDING "YES" TO QUESTION 4
PERCENTAGE FIGURES

(N = 59)
* 12.44% of those responding "yes" (32 persons)
qualified their xesponse by stating that a more liberal
test would be impractical to apply.
t See Table IV for responses to Question 5.
$ See Tables V, VI, & VII for responses to Question 7.
§ 11.29% of all responding mentioned competition
and commercialism as a negative factor.
I See Table IX for responses to Question 10.
TABLE II
TEST

RESPONSE TO QUESTION 2
OF IMPARTIALITY SUGGESTED BY
RESPONDING "YES" OR
AYBE"
PERCENTAGE FIGURES

PERSONS

(N = 41)
Read or
Heard*

Formed
Opinionst

Mi
iscellaneous

No
Description

12.20

14.63

9.76

63.41

* Prospective jurors who stated they had read or
heard of defendant would be chaliengeable for cause.
t Prospective jurors who stated they had formed an
opinion as to defendant's guilt or innocence would be
challengeable for cause even if they also stated that
they could lay their opinions aside and decide solely
on the evidence presented in court.

Response

Eliminate §2,
3 & 4 ..................
Eliminate §2,
2 & 3 ..................
Eliminate §2,
3,4 & 5................
Eliminate §2,
1, 3 &4 ................
Eliminate §2,
2, 3, 4 & 5 ..............
Eliminate §2, 3, and all of §2, 4 except
with regard to scientific evidence ........
Eliminate §3 ...........................
Narrow scope of §1 .....................
Prohibit only editorial interpretation of
prejudicial facts ......................
Prohibit everything until admitted in evidence ...............................
Allow procedure for exposing defects in law
enforcement .........................
Make non-penal ........................
Require only equal space and time for defense ...............................
Require statutory reversal of conviction
where prosecution or police is source of
prejudicial publicity ...................
No answer .............................

1.69
3.39
5.09
1.69
1.69
1.69
1.69
6.79
3.39
8.48
3.39
5.09
1.69

1.69
52.54

THE PRESS AND THE OPPRESSED
TABLE V
7 PERCENTAGE
(N = 124)

RESPONSE TO QUESTION

Statute

Internal

Repula-

FIGURES

No

Both

Other

Neither

Answer

8.07

4.03

10.48

9.68

TABLE VIII
RESPONSE TO QUESTION 8: PERSONS INDICATING
RESERVATIONS RE EFFICACY OF STATISTICS
PERCENTAGE FIGURES
(N = 124)

tion

Response
39.51

28.23

NATURE

TABLE VI
OF OFFENSE INDICATED

By THOSE

RESPONDING "STATUTE" OR 'BOTH" TO QUESTION
7: PERCENTAGE FIGURES

Reliable Statistics Could Not Be Obtained ...........................
Statute Would Not Pass For Political
Reasons Regardless of Confrontation
With Reliable Statistics ............
No Answer ........................

%

12.10

3.23
84.67

(N = 59)
Misdemeanor

Felony

Contempt*

83.06

8.47

8.47

* Persons responding "contempt" described a scheme
whereby statutory contempt would be used, with
publication of prejudicial material constituting a per se
contempt.

TABLE VII
RESPONSE TO QUESTION 7: PENALTIEs SUGGESTED:

PERCENTAGE FIGURES
(N = 124)
Penalty

Fine and/or Imprisonment ...........
Very Heavy Fine ...................
Increased Punishment* ..............
Fine Only .........................

%

44.35
7.26
8.06
3.23

* Prescribing increased punishment for subsequent
offenses and/or where offense with which defendant is
charged is very serious.

TABLE IX
RESPONSE TO QUESTION 10: PERCENTAGE OF PERSONS
INDICATING KINDS OF MrATERIAL CONSIDERED MOST
LIKELY To BE HARmxuL TO DEFENDANT
(N = 124)
Material

%

Confessions ........................
Criminal Background ...............
Everything but fact of arrest until after
admitted in evidence ..............
Prejudicial conclusions indicating
guilt ...........................
"Testimony" not yet in evidence .....
Gory details of offense ...............
Epithets ..........................
"Crusades" to get someone convicted.
Miscellaneous* .....................
No Answer ........................

41.94
32.26
25.00
18.55
14.52
13.71
4.03
2.42
9.68
20.16

* Included were sex involvements, political views,
nature of offense per se, inaccurate reporting of facts,
attributing a motive to defendant, guilt by association, and race.

